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Abstract
We will show that in the case where there are two individuals and
three alternatives (or under the assumption of free-triple property) the
Arrow impossibility theorem (Arrow (1963)) for social welfare functions
that there exists no social welfare function which satisﬁes transitivity,
Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and has no dic-
tator is equivalent to the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem on a 2-dimensional
ball (circle). Our study is an application of ideas by Chichilnisky (1979)
to a discrete social choice problem, and also it is in line with the work
by Baryshnikov (1993). But tools and techniques of algebraic topology
which we will use are more elementary than those in Baryshnikov (1993).
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1 Introduction
Topological approaches to social choice problems have been initiated by Chichilnisky
(1980). In her model a space of alternatives is a subset of Euclidean space, and
individual preferences over this set are represented by normalized gradient ﬁelds.
Her main result is an impossibility theorem that there exists no continuous social
choice rule which satisﬁes unanimity and anonymity. This approach has been
∗This paper is scheduled to be published in Applied Mathematics and Computa-
tion(Elsevier).
1further developed by Chichilnisky (1979), (1982), Koshevoy (1997), Lauwers
(2004), and so on. In particular, by Chichilnisky (1979) the equivalence of her
impossibility result and the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem in the case where there
are two individuals and the choice space is a subset of 2-dimensional Euclidian
space has been shown. On the other hand, Baryshnikov (1993) and (1997) have
presented a topological approach to Arrow’s general possibility theorem, which
is usually called the Arrow impossibility theorem (Arrow (1963)), in a discrete
framework of social choice1.
We will examine the relationship between the Arrow impossibility theorem
for social welfare functions that there exists no binary social choice rule which
satisﬁes transitivity, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives
and has no dictator2, and the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem on a 2-dimensional
ball in the case of two individuals and three alternatives (or under the as-
sumption of free-triple property)3. Our study is an application of ideas by
Chichilnisky (1979) to a discrete social choice problem, and also it is in line
with the work by Baryshnikov (1993). But tools and techniques of algebraic
topology which we will use are more elementary than those used in Baryshnikov
(1993). He used an advanced concept of algebraic topology, nerve of a covering.
It is not contained in most elementary textbooks of algebraic topology, and is
diﬃcult of access for most economists. Our main tools are homology groups of
simplicial complexes. Of course, the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem is a theorem
about continuous functions. We will consider a method to obtain a continuous
function from a discrete social choice rule. Mainly we will show the following
results.
(1) The Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem is equivalent to the result that the re-
striction to an n−1-dimensional sphere Sn¡1 of a continuous function from
an n-dimensional ball Dn to Sn¡1 is homotopic to a constant mapping.
(2) The restriction of a continuous function obtained from a social welfare
function which satisﬁes transitivity, Pareto principle, independence of ir-
relevant alternatives and has no dictator to a subset of the set of proﬁles of
individual preferences, which is homeomorphic to a 2-dimensional ball (or
circle) and the subset is homeomorphic to a 1-dimensional sphere (or cir-
cumference), is not homotopic to a constant mapping. It implies that the
non-existence of social welfare function which satisﬁes transitivity, Pareto
principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives and has no dictator is
equivalent to the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem on a 2-dimensional ball.
In the next section we present the model of this paper, and consider the
homology groups of simplicial complexes which represent the set of individual
1About surveys and basic results of topological social choice theories, see Mehta (1997)
and Lauwers (2000).
2Dictator is an individual whose (strict) preference always coincide with the social prefer-
ence.
3Under the assumption of free-triple property, for each combination of three alternatives
individual preferences are not restricted.
2preferences and the set of the social preference. In Section 3 we will show a result
about the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem and homotopy of continuous functions.
In Section 4 we will prove the main results.
2 The model
There are two individuals, A and B, and three alternatives of a social, economic
or political problem, x1, x2 and x3 (or we assume free-triple property). Indi-
vidual preferences about these alternatives are not restricted. We assume that
individual preferences for these alternatives are linear, that is, their preferences
are always strict, and they are never indiﬀerent about any pair of alternatives.
Individual preferences must be complete and transitive. A social choice rule
which we will consider is a rule which determines a preference of the society
about x1, x2 and x3 corresponding to a combination of preferences of two indi-
viduals. This social choice rule is called a social welfare function. We require
that social welfare functions satisfy transitivity, Pareto principle and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. The means of the latter two conditions are as
follows.
Pareto principle If all individuals prefer an alternative xi to another alterna-
tive xj, then the society must prefer xi to xj.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives The social preference about any
pair of two alternatives xi and xj is determined by only individual prefer-
ences about these alternatives. Individual preferences about other alter-
natives do not aﬀect the social preference about xi and xj.
The Arrow impossibility theorem states that there exists a dictator for any
social welfare function which satisﬁes transitivity, Pareto principle and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, or in other words there exists no social welfare
function which satisﬁes these conditions and has no dictator. Dictator is an
individual whose (strict) preference always coincide with the social preference.
From the set of individual preferences we draw a diagram by the following
procedures.
(1) When an individual prefers x1 to x2 to x3, such a preference is denoted
by (123), and corresponding to this preference we deﬁne a vertex v1. Sim-
ilarly, when an individual prefers x1 to x3 to x2, such a preference is
denoted by (132), and we deﬁne a vertex v2. By similar procedures the
following vertices are deﬁned.
v1 = (123), v2 = (132), v3 = (312), v4 = (321), v5 = (231), v6 = (213)
For example, v6 = (213) denotes a preference of an individual such that
he prefers x2 to x1 to x3.
(2) These six vertices are plotted on a line segment in this order, locate v1 at
both end points, and connect the vertices.
3Figure 1: R
Figure 2: R × R
Denote this diagram by R, and call v1, v2, ···, v6 the vertices of R. It is depicted
in Figure 1.
Two v1’s at both end points of R are not distinguished. The set of individual
preferences is represented by R, and the set of combinations of the preferences of
two individuals is represented by the product space R×R. These combinations
of individual preferences are called preference proﬁles. R × R is depicted as a
square in Figure 2. The preference of individual B is represented from bottom
up, not from left to right. Individual preferences are denoted by pA = v1, pB =
v2 and so on, and preference proﬁles are denoted by p = (pA,pB) = (v1,v3),
and so on.
The social preference is represented by a circumference depicted in Figure 3.
We call this circumference S1. The vertices of S1 are denoted by w1, w2, ···,
4Figure 3: S1
w6. These vertices mean the following social preferences4.
(1) w1: The society prefers x1 to x2, x2 to x3.
(2) w2: The society prefers x1 to x3, x3 to x2.
(3) w3: The society prefers x3 to x1, x1 to x2.
(4) w4: The society prefers x3 to x2, x2 to x1.
(5) w5: The society prefers x2 to x3, x3 to x1.
(6) w6: The society prefers x2 to x1, x1 to x3.
The 1-dimensional homology group (with integer coeﬃcients) of S1 is iso-
morphic to the group of integers Z, that is, we have H1(S1) ∼ = Z.
A social welfare function F is deﬁned as a function from the vertices of R×R
to the vertices of S1. Let us consider a method to obtain a continuous function
from a social welfare function deﬁned on the vertices of R×R. For example, for
points included in a small triangle which consists of (v1,v3), (v2,v3) and (v2,v4)
we deﬁne
F(α(v1,v3) + β(v2,v3) + γ(v2,v4)) = αF(v1,v3) + βF(v2,v3) + γF(v2,v4)
4From Lemma 1 of Baryshnikov (1993) we know that if individual preferences are strict
orders, then the social preference is also a strict order under transitivity, Pareto principle and
independence of irrelevant alternatives.
5where 0 5 α 5 1, 0 5 β 5 1 and 0 5 γ 5 1, α + β + γ = 1. Then, we can
obtain a continuous function for the points in this triangle. By similar ways this
continuous function is extended to the entire R×R, and we obtain a continuous
function for all points in R × R from a discrete social welfare function on the
vertices of R × R. Denote this continuous function by F : R × R −→ S1.
Let us see that this continuous function is well deﬁned for the entire R×R.
By independence of irrelevant alternatives, for example, if F(v1,v3) = w1, we
must have F(v2,v3) = w1 or F(v2,v3) = w2. As this example shows, preferences
represented by adjacent two vertices of R × R are identical about two pairs of
alternatives. When the preference of one of two individuals changes, the social
preference does not change, or it changes to one of adjacent vertices. Therefore,
F is a simplicial mapping. If the preferences of two individuals change, the
social preference moves at most two vertices clockwise or counter-clockwise on
S1, and hence the social preference does not change to the antipodal point or
across the antipodal point on S1. Thus, αF(v1,v3)+βF(v2,v3)+γF(v2,v4) is
well deﬁned. Other cases are similar. Since F deﬁned on the vertices of R × R
is a simplicial mapping, we can deﬁne the homomorphism of homology groups
induced by F. It is denoted by F¤.
Now we consider the following set ∆ of vertices of R × R.
∆ = {(v1,v1),(v2,v2),(v3,v3),(v4,v4),(v5,v5),(v6,v6),(v1,v1)}
The diagram obtained by connecting these vertices is also denoted by ∆. It is
homeomorphic to R. Preference proﬁles of two individuals when the preference
of individual B is ﬁxed at v1, and preference proﬁles when the preference of
individual A is ﬁxed at v1 are denoted, respectively, by A = {(pA,pB) : pB =
v1} and B = {(pA,pB) : pA = v1}. The diagrams obtained by connecting
vertices of A, and similarly obtained from B are also denoted, respectively,
by A and B. They are also homeomorphic to R. The union of these three
sets ∆ ∪ A ∪ B is depicted as the boundary ∂T1 of the triangle T1 in Figure 4.
∆∪A∪B is homeomorphic to the circumference S1. The vertices at four corners
of the square depicted in Figure 4 represent the same proﬁle (v1,v1). The value
of F for them are equal. The 1-dimensional homology group of ∆ ∪ A ∪ B
isomorphic to Z, that is, H1(∆ ∪ A ∪ B) ∼ = Z.
3 The Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem
In this section we show the following theorem about homotopy and the degree
of mapping of a continuous function on an n − 1-dimensional sphere.
Note Let F be a function from n − 1-dimensional sphere Sn¡1 to itself, and
F¤ be the homomorphism of homology groups induced by F,
F¤ : Hn¡1(Sn¡1) −→ Hn¡1(Sn¡1)
6Figure 4: ∆ ∪ A ∪ B and R × R
Hn¡1(Sn¡1) is the n−1-dimensional homology group of Sn¡1. Then, the degree
of mapping of F, which is denoted by dF, is deﬁned as an integer which satisﬁes
F¤(h) = dFh for h ∈ Hn¡1(Sn¡1)
Theorem 1. The following two results are equivalent.
(1) If there exists a continuous function from an n-dimensional ball Dn to
an n − 1-dimensional sphere Sn¡1 (n = 2), F : Dn −→ Sn¡1, then
the following function, which is obtained by restricting F to the boundary
Sn¡1 of Dn,
F|Sn−1 : Sn¡1 −→ Sn¡1
is homotopic to a constant mapping. Since the degree of mapping of a
constant mapping is zero, the degree of mapping of F|Sn−1 is zero.
(2) (The Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem) Any continuous function from
Dn to Dn (n = 2), G : Dn −→ Dn, has a ﬁxed point.
Proof. (1) −→ (2)
Assume that G has no ﬁxed point. Since we always have v  = G(v) at any
point v in Dn, there is a half line starting G(v) across v5. Let F(v) be the
5If v is a ﬁxed point, G(v) and v coincide, and hence there does not exist such a half line.
7intersection point of this half line and the boundary of Dn, which is Sn¡1.
Then, we obtain the following continuous function from Dn to Sn¡1.
F : Dn −→ Sn¡1
In particular, we have F(v) = v for v ∈ Sn¡1. Therefore, F|Sn−1 is
an identity mapping. But, because an identity mapping on Sn¡1 is not
homotopic to any constant mapping, it is a contradiction.
(2) −→ (1)
We show that if there exists a continuous function F from Dn to Sn¡1,
(1) of this theorem is correct whether a continuous function G from Dn to
Dn has a ﬁxed point or not. Deﬁne ft(v) = F[(1−t)v](0 5 t 5 1) for any
point v of Sn¡1. Then, we get a continuous function ft : Sn¡1 −→ Sn¡1.
(1 − t)v is a point which divide t : 1 − t a line segment between v and
the center of Dn, and it is transferred by F to a point on Sn¡1. We
have f0 = F|Sn−1, and f1 = F(0) is a constant mapping whose image is
a point F(0). Since ft is continuous with respect to t, it is a homotopy
from F|Sn−1 to a constant mapping, and the degree of mapping of F|Sn−1
is zero.
An implication of this theorem is as follows.
Corollary 1. If there exists a function from Dn to Sn¡1, F : Dn −→ Sn¡1,
and its restriction to Sn¡1, F|Sn−1 : Sn¡1 −→ Sn¡1, is not homotopic to a
constant mapping, F can not be continuous.
In relation to a social welfare function on R × R, if there exists a function
F deﬁned on the vertices of R ×R, we can obtain a continuous function on the
entire R×R from F by the way explained above. Then, there exists a continuous
function deﬁned on T1. Since T1 is homeomorphic to D2 (2-dimensional ball),
and ∆ ∪ A ∪ B is homeomorphic to S1 (1-dimensional sphere), the restriction
of F to ∆ ∪ A ∪ B, F|∆[A[B, must be homotopic to a constant mapping. If,
when we require that transitivity, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant
alternatives and the non-existence of dictator are satisﬁed by a social welfare
function deﬁned on the vertices of R × R, the restriction of this function to
∆ ∪ A ∪ B is not homotopic to a constant mapping, then there does not exist
such a social welfare function in the ﬁrst place.
4 The main results
From the preliminary analyses in the previous sections we can show the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that there exists a social welfare function F : R × R −→
S1 which satisﬁes transitivity, Pareto principle and independence of irrelevant
alternatives. If F has no dictator, then the degree of mapping of F|∆[A[B is
not zero, and hence it is not homotopic to a constant mapping.
8Proof. By Pareto principle the vertices of ∆ correspond to the vertices of S1 as
follows.
(v1,v1) −→ w1, (v2,v2) −→ w2, (v3,v3) −→ w3
(v4,v4) −→ w4, (v5,v5) −→ w5, (v6,v6) −→ w6
Next, also by Pareto principle, (v2,v1) corresponds to w1 or w2 in S1. First,
assume
(v2,v1) −→ w2 (1)
(1) means that when individual A prefers x3 to x2 and individual B prefers x2
to x3, then the society prefers x3 to x2. By Pareto principle, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, and transitivity we have
(v4,v6) −→ w4
This means that when individual A prefers x3 to x1 and individual B prefers x1
to x3, then the society prefers x3 to x1. Similarly, we get
(v5,v1) −→ w5
This means that when individual A prefers x2 to x1 and individual B prefers x1
to x2, then the society prefers x2 to x1. Similarly, we get
(v6,v2) −→ w6
This means that when individual A prefers x2 to x3 and individual B prefers x3
to x2, then the society prefers x2 to x3. Similarly, we get
(v1,v3) −→ w1
This means that when individual A prefers x1 to x3 and individual B prefers x3
to x1, then the society prefers x1 to x3. Similarly, we get
(v2,v4) −→ w2
This means that when individual A prefers x1 to x2 and individual B prefers
x2 to x1, then the society prefers x1 to x2. These correspondences imply that
individual A is the dictator. Therefore, if there is no dictator, we must have
(v2,v1) −→ w1
This means that when individual A prefers x3 to x2 and individual B prefers x2
to x3, then the society prefers x2 to x3. By Pareto principle and independence
of irrelevant alternatives we get
(v3,v1) −→ w1
This means that when individual A prefers x3 to x1 and individual B prefers x1
to x3, then the society prefers x1 to x3. Similarly, we get
(v4,v2) −→ w2
9This means that when individual A prefers x2 to x1 and individual B prefers
x1 to x2, then the society prefers x1 to x2. Then, by Pareto principle and
independence of irrelevant alternatives we get correspondences from preference
proﬁles to the social preference when the preference of individual B is ﬁxed at
v1 as follows.
(v4,v1) −→ w1, (v5,v1) −→ w1, (v6,v1) −→ w1
Therefore, correspondences from the vertices of A to the vertices of S1 are
obtained as follows.
(v1,v1) −→ w1, (v2,v1) −→ w1, (v3,v1) −→ w1
(v4,v1) −→ w1, (v5,v1) −→ w1, (v6,v1) −→ w1
By similar logic, if individual B is not a dictator, correspondences from the
vertices of B to the vertices of S1 are obtained as follows.
(v1,v1) −→ w1, (v1,v2) −→ w1, (v1,v3) −→ w1
(v1,v4) −→ w1, (v1,v5) −→ w1, (v1,v6) −→ w1
Sets of simplices which are 1-dimensional cycles of ∆ ∪ A ∪ B are only the
following z and its counterpart −z.
z = < (v1,v1),(v2,v1) > + < (v2,v1),(v3,v1) > + < (v3,v1),(v4,v1) >
+ < (v4,v1),(v5,v1) > + < (v5,v1),(v6,v1) > + < (v6,v1),(v1,v1) >
+ < (v1,v1),(v1,v2) > + < (v1,v2),(v1,v3) > + < (v1,v3),(v1,v4) >
+ < (v1,v4),(v1,v5) > + < (v1,v5),(v1,v6) > + < (v1,v6),(v1,v1) >
+ < (v1,v1),(v6,v6) > + < (v6,v6),(v5,v5) > + < (v5,v5),(v4,v4) >
+ < (v4,v4),(v3,v3) > + < (v3,v3),(v2,v2) > + < (v2,v2),(v1,v1) >
Since ∆ ∪ A ∪ B has no 2-dimensional simplex, z is a representative element
of homology classes of ∆ ∪ A ∪ B. z is transferred by the homomorphism of
homology groups F¤ induced by F to the following z0 in S1.
z0 = < w1,w1 > + < w1,w1 > + < w1,w1 > + < w1,w1 > + < w1,w1 >
+ < w1,w1 > + < w1,w1 > + < w1,w1 > + < w1,w1 > + < w1,w1 >
+ < w1,w1 > + < w1,w1 > + < w1,w6 > + < w6,w5 > + < w5,w4 >
+ < w4,w3 > + < w3,w2 > + < w2,w1 >
= < w1,w6 > + < w6,w5 > + < w5,w4 > + < w4,w3 > + < w3,w2 >
+ < w2,w1 >
This is a cycle of S1. Therefore, the homology group induced by (F¤)|∆[A[B,
which is the homomorphism of homology groups induced by F|∆[A[B, is not
trivial, and hence the degree of mapping of F|∆[A[B is not zero.
10From Theorem 1 we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. The non-existence of social welfare function which satisﬁes tran-
sitivity, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives and has no
dictator (the Arrow impossibility theorem) is equivalent to the Brouwer ﬁxed
point theorem.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that with two individuals and three alternatives the Arrow
impossibility theorem is equivalent to the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem on a 2-
dimensional ball (circle) using elementary concepts and techniques of algebraic
topology, in particular, homology groups of simplicial complexes, homomor-
phisms of homology groups.
Our approach may be applied to other social choice problems such as Wil-
son’s impossibility theorem (Wilson (1972)), the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
(Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)) and Amartya Sen’s liberal paradox
(Sen (1979)).
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